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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 The state appeals from the district court’s intermediate appellate decision affirming 
the magistrate’s order dismissing a charge of frequenting a place where drugs were being 
held for use. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Daniel C. Amstad under I.C. § 37-2732(d) with frequenting a 
place where drugs were being held for use.  (R., p. 9.)  Amstad filed a motion to dismiss, 
asserting the facts of his case “do not amount to the offense of ‘frequenting’ as defined in 
Idaho Code § 37-2732(d)” because he was in a car.  (R., pp. 23-25.)  The state responded 
by arguing Amstad was at a “place” where drugs were being used.  (R., pp. 59-67.)  It 
argued that the evidence would show that three people, including Amstad, walked from 
their dorm to a car parked in the dorm parking lot for the specific purpose of smoking 
marijuana together.  (R., p. 62.)   The magistrate granted the motion and dismissed.  (R., 
pp. 72, 137-47 (Tr., p. 59-69).)  The state filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp. 76-77.) 
 The district court affirmed.  (R., pp. 171-78.)  The district court reasoned that a 
“premises” and “place” does not include a parked car, and therefore Amstad could not be 
guilty of frequenting.  (R., pp. 175-78.)  The state filed a notice of appeal timely from the 







 Did the district court err when it concluded that a person in a car with others for the 








A Person In A Parked Car For The Purpose Of Smoking Marijuana With Others Is 




 The district court concluded that Amstad’s presence in a car with others for the 
purpose of smoking marijuana did not fall within the ambit of the frequenting statute.  (R., 
p. 176.)  The district court’s analysis is faulty, and should be reversed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “We exercise free review over statutory interpretation because it is a question of 
law.”  State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3, 343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015).  On review of a decision 
rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate capacity, the reviewing court 
“directly review[s] the district court’s decision to determine whether it correctly decided 
the issues presented to it on appeal.”  Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 233 P.3d 102, 
107 (2010); see also Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008). 
 
C. The District Court Erred By Concluding That Amstad’s Presence In A Car 
Excluded A Finding Of His Being Present At A Place Where Marijuana Was Being 
Held For Use  
 
“Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain language.”  State v. Taylor, 
160 Idaho 381, 385, 373 P.3d 699, 703 (2016).  “When the statute’s language is 
unambiguous, the legislature’s clearly expressed intent must be given effect, and we do not 
need to go beyond the statute’s plain language to consider other rules of statutory 
construction.”  State v. Leary, 160 Idaho 349, 352, 372 P.3d 404, 407 (2016).  “Only where 
the language is ambiguous will this Court look to rules of construction for guidance and 
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consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations.”  In re Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho 
345, 349, 326 P.3d 347, 351 (2014).   
Where the words of the statute are ambiguous because subject to more than one 
meaning, the Court examines “not only the literal words of the statute, but also the 
reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its 
legislative history.”  Taylor, 160 Idaho at 385, 373 P.3d at 703 (internal quotation omitted).  
“Where ambiguity exists as to the elements or potential sanctions of a crime, this Court 
will strictly construe the criminal statute in favor of the defendant.”  State v. Rhode, 133 
Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999).  However, the ambiguity must be “grievous” 
and “not resolved by looking at the text, context, history or policy of the statute” before the 
interpretation benefiting the defendant must be chosen.  State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 
440, 313 P.3d 765, 768 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 947, 265 
P.3d 1155, 1159 (Ct. App. 2011) (rule of lenity “does not require a court to disregard the 
purpose of a statute when it is clear from the context”).  “The rule of lenity applies only if, 
after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, we can make no more than a guess 
as to what Congress intended.”  Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998).   
The relevant language of the statute is as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to be present at or on premises of any 
place where he knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured 
or cultivated, or are being held for distribution, transportation, delivery, 
administration, use, or to be given away. 
 
I.C. § 37-2732(d).  The portion of this language in dispute is “to be present at or on premises 
of any place where he knows illegal controlled substances are … being held.”   (R., pp. 
175-78.)  This language has two clauses separated by a disjunctive “or.”  Thus, this statute 
is violated by anyone “present at … any place where he knows illegal controlled 
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substances” are being held or “… on premises of any place where he knows illegal 
controlled substances” are being held.  I.C. § 37-2732(d) (emphasis added).  The evidence 
showed Amstad was present at such a place, and therefore the charge should have been 
decided by a jury.   
The district court phrased the issue before it as “whether a person can be ‘present 
at or on the premises of any place’ if they [sic] are in a vehicle” and held that a parked car 
is neither a “place” nor a “premises.”  (R., pp. 174-76 (brackets original).)  As shown above, 
however, nothing in the plain language of the statute provides that a person cannot “be 
‘present at or on the premises of any place’ if they [sic] are in a vehicle.”  Even accepting 
the core premise of the district court’s reasoning, that a parked car is not itself a “place” or 
“premises,” such simply begs the question of whether Amstad was “present at” a place 
where marijuana was being held for use.  For example, a person who goes with friends to 
smoke marijuana on a sidewalk, at a park, or in a garage would be “present at or on 
premises of any place where he knows illegal controlled substances are being … held” for 
use and thus guilty of frequenting.  There is no reading of this statute’s plain language or 
legislative intent indicating that if those same people move to a parked car adjacent to the 





no longer frequenting.1  The district court’s holding that a person cannot “be ‘present at or 
on the premises of any place’ if they [sic] are in a vehicle” (R., p. 174; see also R., pp. 174-




 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s intermediate 
appellate decision affirming the magistrate’s order granting the motion to dismiss. 




      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 








                                            
1 The district court expressed some concern about the state “chang[ing] the issue” on 
appeal.  (R., pp. 173-74.)  The issue before the district court, according to that court, was 
whether a person can be present at or on the premises of any place where drugs are being 
held if that person is in a vehicle.  (R., p. 174.)  The state specifically argued to the 
magistrate that excluding activities in cars from the frequenting statute would “yield absurd 
results” because persons engaged in drug activities could simply enter a car to shield 
themselves from this statute (R., pp. 103-04 (Tr., pp. 25-26)), the same argument the state 
is currently making.  The issue, as phrased by the parties, has always been whether being 
in a vehicle shields a person from prosecution under I.C. § 37-2732(d), and the district 
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